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We give a denition of reasoning by analogy, which is tailored to a
setting of decision making under uncertainty. We present a model of
decision making which is based on such a denition, and show that it is
compatible with a large class of preferences.
1 Reasoning by Analogy
Analogy is the recognition that one thing A (a phenomenon, a problem, etc.) is
like another thing B and that, therefore, consequences (inferences, explanations,
solutions, etc.) that can be drawn from A can be drawn from B as well. Analogy
is a reasoning process that is so pervasive in human life that can be viewed as one
of the cornerstones of human thought. In the Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind
[7], Analogy is recognized as, ... an important kind of thinking contributing
to such cognitive tasks as explanation, planning and decision making (Paul
Thagard). Because of this, it is not surprising that the concept of Analogy has
been an object of philosophical reection since ancient times.1
As of today, research on the concept of Analogy and on the process of ana-
logical reasoning has become increasingly important in the study of Articial
Intelligence (see, for instance, [10]). Again, this is not surprising given the
nature of the subject. What is surprising is that classical theories of decision
making under uncertainty do not explicitly recognize the role played by analog-
ical reasoning.
Theories of decision making under uncertainty are concerned with explain-
ing/guiding the behavior of individuals who have to choose a course of action
I beneted from comments and suggestions from Paolo Ghirardato, Tzachi Gilboa, Ket
Richter, Aldo Rustichini, Paolo Siconol, Max Stinchcombe and Stan Wellisz. I also wish
to thank seminar participants at RUD 2003, CalTech, University of Minnesota, University of
Texas-Austin, Columbia University, University of Rochester, Rutgers University, University
of Turin, Ohio State University.
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1To give just one example, reections on the concept recur several times in St. Thomas
from the Summa Theologica to the De potentia to the De veritates.
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in an uncertain environment. It is indisputable that, in a large variety of situ-
ations, individuals perceive this as a newproblem, in the sense that they do
not have a ready-madesolution for it. In such situations, individuals tend to
rely on their past experience, that is, they recall solutions that they gave in the
past and try to adapt them to the new circumstances. It is precisely these
types of processes that are unaccounted for by classical theories.
In recent years, Gilboa and Schmeidler started a research program (see, for
instance, the comprehensive [16] and the more recent [17]) aiming to ll, at
least in part, this gap. Their Case-Based Theory of Decisions can be viewed as
a specialization to a decision theoretic setting of the idea of Case-Based Rea-
soning. This is founded on the intuition that the problems one faces are often
similar to problems encountered in the past and, therefore, that past solutions
may be of use in current situations. The idea of Case-Based Reasoning becomes
especially powerful when the reasoning method is coupled with a learning par-
adigm: solutions given to new problems update the case base thus producing
new strategies to attack new problems. Strictly speaking, Case-Based Reason-
ing refers to problems based on single-domain cases.2 As such, it is a special
case of Analogical Reasoning that allows for the use of past cases from di¤erent
domains and goes even beyond that.
In the next section, I propose a denition of Reasoning by Analogy that
is tailored to a setting of decision making under uncertainty. Building on this
denition, I present (Section 5) a model of decision making which accounts for
the possibility that a decision maker might choose a course of action based
on past or even on only potential cases from di¤erent domains. The model
contains several ingredients that combine to give rise to a certain structure. In
Section 6, I show that one of the most general axiomatic models of decision
making we know of (see [11]) displays the same structure as the model built
on the idea of analogical reasoning. In a way, that structure had always been
there, and the task accomplished by Theorem 2 (Section 5) is that of bringing
that structure to light. Later, in Section 7, I show that the result holds for
axiomatizations weaker than that in [11]. A few comments about the result are
given in Section 8. There, I also briey discuss the link between the concept of
analogical reasoning presented in this paper and some important problems in
decision theory like unforeseeen contingencies and ambiguity.
2 Models and Analogies
Suppose that a decision maker has to rank a set of bets, F , regarding the
meteorological conditions in Siberia (S) over the month of July in a certain
year. Lacking any direct experience of the weather in Siberia, our decision
maker might try to translatethis problem into a problem he is more familiar
with. For instance, the meteorological conditions over the same month in his
own state, which, we suppose, is California (C). In other words, let us assume
2Roughly speaking, di¤erent cases pertain to a single domain if they are describable by
means of the same set of parameters.
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that the decision maker has some information about C, described by a certain
-algebra C, and that, on the basis of this information, he is able to rank all the
bets in
F+(C) = ff : C ! R+ j f bounded and C-measurableg
Let us denote by %C the decision makers ranking of the bets in F+(C). Now,
our decision maker wants to use this knowledge, and possibly the knowledge
that Siberia and California are at a di¤erent latitude, longitude, that they are
both on the Pacic, etc., to solve the problem he faces, namely that of ranking
the bets in F .
To begin, let us dene  as the coarsest -algebra which makes all the bets
in F measurable, and (to simplify the exposition) set
F = F+(S) = ff : S ! R+ j f bounded and -measurableg
Next, we want to formalize the idea that the problem of ordering F+(S) can be
translatedinto the problem of ordering F+(C), which has already been solved
by the decision maker with the ordering %C . The task boils down to identifying
two requirements. First, it must be the case that each bet fi 2 F+(S) can be
identied to a bet i 2 F+(C). In other words, there must exist a mapping
 : F+(S)! F+(C). Second, it must be the case that, modulo the renaming of
the bets produced by the mapping , the objects F+(S) and (F+(S))  F+(C)
are the same. This means that if there exists a certain relation between any two
bets f; g 2 F+(S), then this relation must be preserved once the mapping  is
applied. That is, it must be the case that the mapping  preserves whatever
structure is associated with F+(S). In our context, F+(S) is an a¢ ne space of
measurable mappings. Hence, the requirement that  be structure-preserving
translates into the demand that  displays the following properties
(i) a¢ nity: (f + g) = (f) + (g); ;  2 R+
(ii) normality: fn % f =) (fn)% (f); n 2 N.
That is, if a bet h 2 F+(S) is a combination of two other bets, f; g 2 F+(S),
then we want (h) to be an analogous combination of the bets (f) and (g);
and if a collection of bets ffng in F+(S) approximates a bet f 2 F+(S), then
we want the collection f(fn)g to approximate the bet (f). Mappings like 
are known as kernels or generalized transition probabilities (see Appendix A.1
for more about kernels).
Once F+(S) and F+(C) are made to correspond to each other by means
of a kernel  : F+(S) ! F+(C), then the problem of ordering F+(S) can be
solved by setting
f % g iff (f) %C (g)
We summarize the content of this discussion in the following denition.3
Denition 1 Let (S;) and (C; C) be two measurable spaces. Let d be a deci-
sion maker who displays choices <S and <C on F+(S) and F+(C), respectively.
3Our denition is in the spirit of [9]. The latter has been criticized in [3]. See also [23] and
[10] for more on the debate.
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We say that the problem (F+(C);%C) is a model for ranking the bets in F+(S)
if there exists a kernel  : F+(S)! F+(C) such that
f <S g iff (f) <C (g)
We say that the problems (F+(C);%C) and (F+(S);%S) are analogous if the
kernel is a bijection.
The denition makes it clear that the concepts of model and analogy pertain
to a decision maker. In other words, one can exhibit two di¤erent decision
makers for whom the problems on S and C are analogous but the analogy is
realized by di¤erent kernels as well as a third decision maker for whom there
exist no analogy between the two problems.
3 Kernels and models
As a general matter, the possibility of solving a problem, say ordering F+(S), by
analogy with another problem, say (F+(C);%C), corresponds to the existence
of an a¢ ne mapping  : F+(S) ! RC+ with the property that range() 
F+(C). As the reader has probably already realized, the existence of such a
mapping depends crucially on the relation between the two -algebras C and 
or, equivalently, between C and the set of bets F o¤ered to the decision maker.
It is important that the reader keep in mind that the issue, far from being
merely technical, is a very substantial one. The -algebra C on C describes (by
assumption) the decision makers understanding of C. This is the same as saying
that the decision makers knowledge is described by F+(C). Now, suppose that
the decision maker attempts to translate his problem into (F+(C);%C), and
that this produces a certain (non-constant) a¢ ne mapping  : F+(S) ! RC+.
Suppose further that C is so coarse that this mapping does not satisfy the
condition range(~)  F+(C). In a manner of speaking, what happens is that
F+(C) is not big enough to accommodate all the functions in F+(S). This
situation has a very transparent meaning. Knowledge of (F+(C);%C) is not
enough to solve the problem at hand. Equivalently, (F+(C);%C) cannot be a
model for ordering the bets in F+(S).
To illustrate the point further, consider the following example. Let S =
[0; 1] be equipped with the Lebesgue -algebra, and let C be a two-point set,
C = fc1; c2g. A mapping ci 7 ! i 2 (S) denes a mapping (see Appendix
A.1)  : F+([0; 1])! RC+ in a way that each bet f on [0; 1] is associated to the







Clearly,  is a¢ ne. Now, suppose that C is equipped with the trivial algebra
f;; Cg. Then, while the set of real-valued mappings on C is isomorphic (in a
set-theoretic sense) to the plane, the set of measurable functions on C consists
of the constants only. If 1 6= 2, then it is an easy matter to check that
uncountably many measurable functions on [0; 1] are associated to vectors whose
rst coordinate di¤ers from the second, that is to non-constant functions on C.
Since these are not measurable, we see that range() * F+(C).
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What drives the example is that while C is a two-point set it behaves, from
the viewpoint of the measurable properties, as a one-point space. This property
is only seemingly articial. In fact, as shown in [1], many natural information
structures produce spaces of this sort.
4 Ellsbergs three-color urn experiment
Here we present two instances in which an analogy fails to exists. In the rst,
there is no a¢ ne mapping capable of realizing an analogy satisfying certain con-
ditions; in the second, any a¢ ne mapping fails the range condition discussed in
the previous section. In both cases, the underlying decision problem is Ellsbergs
three-color urn experiment [8]. Recall that in the three-color urn experiment,
a decision maker is asked to rank bets which pay a certain amount of money
depending on the color of a ball which is drawn from an urn. He is told that
the urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are red (R) while the remaining are either
blue (B) or green (G). Suppose also that the decision maker is told that the
blue balls are either 28 or 32.
As a rst example, consider the following story. Suppose that an alien
(clearly, out of luck) happens to land on a decision theorists backyard. The
decision theorist, enticed by the rather unique opportunity to test a subject un-
contamined by human preconceptions, locks the alien in a room, and performs
a rst experiment. This goes as follows. A rst urn (labeled C) is put on a
table, and the alien is told that C contains 30 balls. Next, the decision theorist
tells the alien that he has two more urns, one with 28 balls and one with 32.
He puts one of those on the table, let us call it U, and asks the alien to point at
one urn between C and U. If the urn the alien points at is the one containing
the highest number of balls, then the alien will be rewarded. Suppose that,
for whatever reason, the alien points at C, that is CU. This being done, the
decision theorist moves on, and performs Ellsbergs experiment with the alien.
The latter, called upon ranking the bets, realizes that the problem of comparing
many bets is of the same type as the problem of comparing C and U, the one
that he solved before. Driven by this observation, he would associate betting on
R with betting on C, betting on B or G with betting on U, betting on B + G
with betting on (possibly a multiple of) C, betting on R + G with betting on
(possibly a multiple of) U, etc. Here, the requirement that the mapping be
a¢ ne is clearly important: in particular, it expresses the fact that there is a
xed number of balls in Ellsbergs urn (a fact which we assume is understood
by the alien). However, it is an easy matter to check that the aliens mapping
cannot be a¢ ne. That is, the problem of ranking C and U does not provide a
solution for Ellsbergs experiment.
As a second example, suppose that the alien starts out with Ellsbergs ex-
periment. In a rather sophisticated fashion, he realizes that ranking Ellsbergs
bets is equivalent to betting on the realization of one of two measure spaces,
(S;; 1) and (S;; 2), where (S;) is the set fR;B;Gg equipped with the
maximal algebra, 1 = (30; 28; 32) and 2 = (30; 32; 28). This is the same as
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saying that he is considering as a candidate model the set M = f1; 2g. How-
ever, not knowing much about humanspsychology, the alien might be incapable
of assesing which process might have led the decision theorist to select (S;; 1)
rather than (S;; 2) or vice versa. This translates into the fact that the aliens
algebra on M is the trivial one. In such a situation, just like in the example of
the previous section, any a¢ ne mapping F+(S)! RC+ fails the range condition.
In fact, the only acts corresponding to measurable mappings are those in the
linear span of "betting on R", "betting on B + G" and "betting on S ": the
set F+(M) is not big enough to accommodate all the acts that the alien has
to rank. Incidentally, this situation lends itself to an interesting interpretation.
Acts corresponding to measurable mappings on M are precisely those acts that
are measurable with respect to the decision makers information. We may call
these acts subjectively measurable. This class restricted to indicator functions
gives us a class of subjectively measurable events: on the basis of his informa-
tion, the decision maker is able to assess the likelihood of these events. In our
example, the class consists of the events f?; R;B [G;Sg.4 We will come back
to this point in the concluding remarks.
5 More models
Here, we want to allow for the possibility that our decision maker uses more than
one model to solve the problem at hand, that of ordering the bets in F+(S).
For instance, when it comes to forecasting the weather in Siberia, the decision
maker might use, not only his knowledge of the weather in California, but also
his knowledge of the weather in Nevada as well as that of any relation between
the weather in California and Nevada, and so forth. A bit more formally, let
M be the set of models for our decision maker. Each model m 2 M is a pair
(F+(Cm);%Cm), where (Cm; Cm) is some measurable space, and there is given
a kernel m : F+(S) ! F+(Cm). Each model produces, by means of the
associated kernel, an ordering of the bets in F+(S), and, generally speaking,
di¤erent models produce di¤erent orderings. Then, the decision maker uses this
collection of orderings to come up, if possible, with a solution for his problem.
Just like before, the decision makers understanding of M is described by two
ingredients: (a) the set of bets on M that the he knows how to order; and (b)
the way he orders them. The rst is described by a -eld, M, of subsets of
M or, equivalently, by the set F+(M) of nonnegative, boundedM-measurable
functions. The second, by a binary relation, %M , on F+(M). Intuitively, one
might think of the latter as representing the decision makers assessments of
which model is more likely to apply. To simplify the exposition, let us assume
that, for each m 2 M , the ordering %Cm is represented by a functional jm :
4A similar conclusion can be reached in the rst example. There the decision maker sets
up a mapping taking R into C and B and G into U. Given the maximal algebra on fC,Ug, this
mapping produces on S exactly the algebra described in the text. In general, however, the
two procedures are not equivalent as the class of events obtained with the second procedure
is only a -system.
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F+(Cm)! R+. Such an assumption could be easily dispensed with, but at the
cost of introducing a fairly cumbersome notation. Since here we are concerned
more with the basic ideas rather than with formalities, the simplication is, in
fact, harmless.
Following the idea outlined above, each function f 2 F+(S) is now associated
to the function f 2 RM+ which at point m 2M takes the value
f (m) = jm(f)
In a sense, the function f is a description of the bet f when all models are taken
into account. Let  : F+(S)! RM+ be the function dened by f 7 ! f . At this
point, just like in Section 3, we have two possibilities. Either range()  F+(M)
or the inclusion does not hold. In the rst case, the decision maker solves his
problem by setting
f % g iff (f) %M (g)
In the second, he concludes that his understanding of (his information about)
M is not enough to solve the problem at hand, and must rely on other consid-
erations.5
On the other hand, if it happens that range()  F+(M) then the problem
of ranking the bets in F+(S) splits into two parts. First, the mapping  takes
f into (f), then (f) is ranked by means of %M . If, to x ideas, we assume
that %M be itself represented by a functional V : F+(M) ! R+, then we can
summarize the discussion by means of the following diagram
F+(S)
 ! F+(M)
I & # V
R+
that is
f % g iff I(f)  I(g)
where I : F+(S)! R+ is dened by I = V  .
We conclude the section with a couple of remarks about the process of de-
cision making that emerges from our construction. First, we suggest another
possible interpretation of this process, which exploits the fact (noted in Sec-
tion 1) that Case-Based Reasoning is a special case of Reasoning by Analogy.
According to this point of view, each element in m 2 M can be thought of as
a case or, more generally, as a collection of cases on the same domain. Then,
the associated ordering on F+(S) can be thought of as the ordering suggested
by the experiencem and by the mapping m. The set M is the collection
of all such experiences and the eld M describes the decision makers view of
5Roughly, it means that the decision maker has to rely on considerations which are non-
measurablewith respect to his information about M .
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how all these experiences (and the associated orderings on F+(S)) t together.
We would like to emphasize, however, that in general M may contain, not only
cases actually experienced by the decision maker, but also hypothetical cases
and even cases the decision maker has never thought of. As a matter of fact, the
eld M and the functional V determine which cases in M a¤ect the decision
makers ordering of the acts. For instance, suppose that A  M is a subset
of cases that the decision maker has never thought of and that, as such, are
not going to a¤ect his behavior. If, for instance, V is dened by means of a
probability measure P onM, then the condition P (A) = 0 would convey that
such cases play no role.6
6 Choice-based foundations for models and analo-
gies
The whole discussion above was heuristic. Some readers might nd our den-
itions of model and analogy reasonable, others might be sceptical about them.
The same can be said about the model of decision making which we outlined
at the end of the previous section. It is a fact, nonetheless, that such a model
admits a rigorous, choice-based, foundation.
Let F0 denote the set of simple -measurable acts and Fc that of constant
acts. Let % be a preference relation on F0 satisfying the following axioms.
A1 % is complete and transitive.
A2 (C-independence) For all f; g 2 F0 and h 2 Fc and for all  2 (0; 1)
f  g () f + (1  )h  g + (1  )h
A3 (Archimedean property) For all f; g; h 2 F0, if f  g and g  h then
9;  2 (0; 1) such that f + (1  )h  g and g  f + (1  )h.
A4 (Monotonicity) For all f; g 2 F0, f(s) % g(s) =) f % g.
A5 (Non-degeneracy) 9x; y 2 X such that x  y.
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [11] have shown that such preferences
are completely described by the functional I : F+(S)! R dened by









where C is a weak*-compact set of probability measures,  : F+(S) ! [0; 1]
and u is a utility function on the prize space. It is readily seen that as special
cases, one obtains -maxmin expected utility (8 2 [0; 1]), Choquet expected
utility and Subjective expected utility. With less emphasis on the form of the
functional I and more on the structure that emerges from the theorem, we can
reformulate the result as follows.
6The converse to this statement is not true. P (A) = 0 does not mean that the decision
maker did not think of cases in A.
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Theorem 2 Given a preference relation satisfying Axioms 1 to 5 there exist
(i) a measurable space (M;M)
(ii) an a¢ ne mapping  : F+(S)! F+(M)
(iii) a functional V : F+(M)! R
such that
f <S g iff V  (f)  V  (g)
Moreover, one can take M = C  (S) and  is dened by f 7 ! f , where f





Remark 3 A utility function on the prize space, u : X ! R+, produces a
mapping from the set of acts into F+(S) given by f 7 ! uf . In the statement of
the theorem, we have identied an act with its image in F+(S). This is harmless
and simplies the notation. We will stick with this convention throughout the
paper.
The theorem says that such a general model of decision making displays the
same structure as the model we proposed at end of last section. In light of
this observation, those discussions now provide a possible interpretation for the
model emerging from Theorem 2. In other words, we can think of elements in
M as models for the decision maker and of the functional I as consisting of
two parts as in the diagram below
F+(S)
 ! F+(M;M)
I & # V
R+
The rst part is the mapping , which takes a bet f 2 F+(S) into a function
f 2 F+(M). At model m 2 M , f takes a real value, f (m), which can be
interpreted as the evaluation of bet f corresponding to that model. All such
possible evaluations are, then, collected together and lead to a single evaluation
of the bet f by means of the functional V .
In [11], Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci introduced the following re-
lation on F , which they termed unambiguous preference relation.
Denition 4 ([11]) Let f; g 2 F . f is unambiguously preferred to g, f % g,
if
f + (1  )h % g + (1  )h
for all  2 (0; 1) and h 2 F .
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As shown in [11] (Sec. B.3), for a preference relation satisfying A1 to A5,
the following axiom is equivalent to the property that all the priors in the
representation are countably additive.
A6 (Monotone Continuity) For all x; y; z 2 X such that y  z, and all
sequences of events fAngn1   with An # ;, there exists n 2 N such that
y  xAnz.
The introduction of Axiom 6 allows us to conclude that the mapping  in
Theorem 2 is a kernel. As noticed,  is a¢ ne. Without Axiom A6, this is all
we can say. In particular, we cannot conclude that  is normal because with
nitely additive measure the Dominated Convergence Theorem need not hold.
However, with Axiom 6, all the measures in the theorem are countably additive.
Hence, since every f is bounded, it is immediate to verify that  is normal.
7 More general preferences
In this section, we are going to show that theorems of the above type hold for
a much wider class of preferences. In Theorem 5 below, we drop axiom A2 (C-
independence) and signicantly weaken other axioms. Dropping the axiom of
C-independence is especially interesting in that it allows us to cover the class of
Variational Preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [22]) which ap-
pears in important applications in Macroeconomics and in Finance (Hansen and
Sargent [18]). From a more theoretical perspective, Ghirardato, Maccheroni and
Marinacci [12] have shown that C-independence is the crucial property guaran-
teeing the complete separation between utility and beliefs(see [12] with regard
to this terminology). Because of this, preferences satisfying A1 to A5 enjoy spe-
cial properties, and are termed invariant biseparable preferences. Then, our
Theorem 5 shows that the properties of the previous section hold for all bisepa-
rable preferences (not necessarily invariant) and beyond that. In Theorem 6, we
show that our conclusions extend beyond the class of Archimedean preferences.
By this, we mean that the property in axiom A3 fails not only for general acts,
but for constant acts too. In such a case, there exists no real-valued utility on
the prize space.
To begin, let us introduce two new axioms:
A3X, the prize space, is a connected, separable topological space. More-
over, for each x0 2 X, the sets fx 2 X j x % x0g and fx 2 X j x - x0g are
closed.
CE (Certainty Equivalents) For all f 2 F0, 9xf 2 X : f  xf .
Theorem 5 Let % be a preference relation on F0. If % satises A1, A3and
CE, then there exist
(i) a measurable space (M;M)
(ii) an a¢ ne mapping  : F+(S)! F+(M)
(iii) a functional V : F+(M)! R
such that
f <S g iff V  (f)  V  (g)
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Moreover, one can take M = (S) and  is dened by f 7 ! f , where f is





The proof is in Appendix. Just as in the proof of Theorem 2, we use the
existence of a utility function on the prize space. Axioms A1 and A3guarantee
the existence of a utility. However, because we have dropped A2, the utility is
not necessarily linear.
We also observe that, as a special case, the same statement holds if we rein-
troduce A4 and replace CE with the continuity assumption S1 in [14], Section
3.3. For, in such a case, Lemma 29 in [14] implies that axiom CE is automat-
ically satised. Such preferences are not necessarily biseparable in that they
do not have to satisfy the assumption of Binary Comonotonic Independence in
[14], Section 3.3.
We now move to the non-Archimedean case. We rst introduce the following
axiom, which weakens A2 in that it requires that independence hold for elements
in the prize space only.
LC For all x; y; z 2 X and for all  2 (0; 1)
x  y () x+ (1  )z  y + (1  )z
Given axiom LC, the extension of the above results to the non-Archimedean case
obtains along similar lines. In fact, axioms A1 and LC guarantee the existence
of a utility representing the ordering on the prize space. Since we gave up the
Archimedean axiom, such a utility is not valued in the reals but rather in an
ordered vector space OV  (see Hausner [19]). Without loss, we can assume
that the latter is a Banach space. Hence, acts can be identied to mappings
from S to this Banach space. By axiom CE, we can dene an operator from
such mappings to OV , which represents the decision makers ordering of the
acts. Finally, we dene  and V just like we did in the previous theorems.
The only di¤erence is that the integrals of the previous theorems as well as the
mapping V are now OV -valued (the integrals are, in fact, Bochner integrals).
Summarizing, we have
Theorem 6 Let % be a preference relation on F0. If % satises A1, A4, CE
and LC, then there exist
(o) a utility function u : X ! OV , where OV  is a Banach space.
(i) a measurable space (M;M)
(ii) an a¢ ne mapping  : F0(S;OV )! F (M;OV ) 7
(iii) a mapping V : F (M;OV )! OV 
such that
f <S g iff V  (f)  V  (g)
7F0(S;OV ) is the set of simple measurable mappings S ! OV  and F (M;OV ) that of
measurable mappings M ! OV .
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Moreover, one can take M = (S) and  is dened by f 7 ! f , with f being





where the integral on the RHS is a Bochner integral.
8 Concluding remarks
We have shown that many preferences are compatible with the idea of analogical
reasoning presented here. The main weakness of our result is obvious: neither
we proved the uniqueness of the axiomatization associated to our model, nor
any uniqueness result can be obtained on the basis of the data we used. In
other words, while the preferences we have studied are certainly compatible
with the resoning process we have proposed, they might be compatible with
other types of reasoning as well, and nothing in this paper would tell how to
screen among di¤erent possibilities. We believe that much tighter results might
be obtained by explicitly modeling a dynamic process where, very much in the
spirit of Gilboa and Schmeidler [17], one keeps track of the problems solved
by the decision maker, of the outcomes realized in those and where the idea
of analogical reasoning is coupled with a learning paradigm compatible with it.
This goes, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, it stays that, in a large
variety of cases, we can think of individuals as making their choices by drawing
analogies in the way described here. Probably, the strength of our denition
lies herein. If the reader agrees that analogy is a pervasive process in human
life (see Section 1), then he would probably agree that any denition that does
not accomplish this is suspicious, to say the least. From this perspective, our
results say that our denition is a suitable contender for a "right" denition,
and might serve as basis for further work (for instance, a dynamic extension a
la[17]). After all, the study of reasoning processess underlying decision making
is still a largely unexplored territory.
8.1 Analogy, ambiguity and unforeseen contingencies
In Section 4, we saw examples where an analogy fails to exist: a decision
maker was trying to establish an analogy between the problem of ranking
F+(S) and another problem (or set of problems) (F+(C);%C) but the map-
ping  : F+(S) ! RC+ failed the range condition discussed in Section 3. In
this circumstances, we are led to distinguish between acts in  1(F+(C)) and
acts in F+(S)n 1(F+(C)): while acts in  1(F+(C)) which we call subjec-
tively measurable can be evaluated on the basis of the information encoded in
(F+(C);%C), acts in F+(S)n 1(F+(C)) cannot. As such, this distinction is
reminiscent of that between unambiguous and ambiguous acts, which has been
studied by several scholars. In [1], it is shown that the class of subjectively
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measurable events (the class of indicator functions in  1(F+(C)) is always a
-system and always contains the class of unambiguous events in the sense of
[11] and [24]. We refer the reader to [1] for more details.
Situations where an analogy fails to to exist lend themselves to a somewhat
"dual" interpretation linking the concept of analogy to that of unforeseen con-
tingencies [5]. The idea is that, in actual circumstances, individuals might erro-
neously establish an analogy between the problem at hand and another problem
they solved before, but by doing so they would "misrepresent" the problem they
face. For instance, let us consider an individual who is in the process of negoti-
ating a contract with another party, and let us suppose that, from the viewpoint
of a perfectly informed outside observer, the individuals problem is equivalent
to that of ranking all acts F+(S) on a certain measurable space (S;). In actual
situations, however, there is no guarantee that the individual would recognize
such equivalence. In fact, one of the most arduous tasks one typically faces is
that of coming up with a correct description of the problem at hand; that is, to
understand what are the alternatives available, what are the relevant contingen-
cies, etc.. It is then possibile maybe even common that our individual might
erroneously think that the problem he faces is analogous to some other prob-
lem, say (F+(C);%C), that he solved before. In this case, he would recognize
only alternatives that are in the set  1(F+(C)), and just would not "think" of
those in F+(S)n 1(F+(C)) (as an extreme case, the individual might conclude
that he has only one choice while other alternatives are, in fact, available). The
underlying class of relevant events would also be constructed following the same
procedure, and events (=indicator functions) in n 1(F+(C)) would describe
events that he just did not think of.
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The concept of kernel is the building block of our denition of reasoning by
analogy. In fact, kernels play an important role throughout this work. Thus, it
is appropriate to gather here a few basic facts about them. For more, the reader
should consult [21].
Let (Y;Y) and (Y 0;Y 0) be two measurable spaces. A kernel from Y to Y 0 is
a mapping  : F+(Y )! F+(Y 0) which is
(i) a¢ ne: (f + g) = (f) + (g); ;  2 R+
(ii) normal: fn % f =) (fn)% (f); n 2 N
In other words, a kernel is a representation (that is, a mapping which is
structure-preserving) of the positive measurable functions on Y into the positive
measurable functions on Y 0. Any kernel can be equivalently described by means
of a mapping, Y 0 ! +(Y ), from Y 0 to the set, (Y ), of positive measures on
Y . In fact, one associates the element y0 2 Y 0 to the measure y0 2 (Y ), which
is dened by the equation
y
0
(A) = ((A)) (y
0); for every A 2 Y
and the mapping
Y 0 ! +(Y ) defined by y0 7 ! y0 (1)
is measurable in the sense that for every A 2 Y, the function on Y 0 which takes
the value y
0
(A) at the point y0 2 Y 0 is an element of F+(Y 0).
The converse of this is not necessarily true. While any mapping Y 0 ! (Y )
denes a mapping ~ : F+(Y ) ! RY 0 , it is not guaranteed that range(~) 
F+(Y 0). That is, ~ might fail to be measurable in the above sense. For instance,
given Y 0 ! (Y ), we can dene ~ by
~ : f 7 ! ~(f)








and it is clear that whether or not ~(f) is a measurable function on Y 0, i.e. is
an element of F+(Y 0), depends on the -algebra Y 0 that we have on Y 0. On the
other hand, it is immediate to check that if range(~)  F+(Y 0), then ~ is a¢ ne
and normal and, therefore, it is a kernel, and all kernels are dened essentially
in this way (see equation (2)).
A.2 Omitted proofs
Recall that S is the domain of the acts,  is a xed eld of events in S and
X is the prize space. We assume that X is a convex set. As it is well-known,
such an assumption can be justied by thinking of X as the set of lotteries on
some given set of outcomes as in Anscombe and Aumann [2]. Alternatively, the
assumption can be justied on the basis of the axiomatization of preferences
given in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi [13].
Let F0 be the set of simple -measurable acts (acts that take only nitely
many values in X) and let Fc be the set of constant acts. Let % be a binary
relation on F0, and let  denote its asymmetric part.
Elements in the prize space are identied to the set of constant acts. Axioms
1 to 4 in the text imply the existence of a linear utility on the prize space. As
noticed (remark 3), this allows to identify acts with the set B0(S;W ) of bounded
-measurable simple functions on S which take values inW = range(u). Gilboa
and Schmeidler [15] have shown that preferences satisfying A1 to A5 are rep-
resented by a functional I : B0(S;W ) ! R which is C-independent, positively
homogeneous (which allows to extend by homogeneity I to the whole B0 the
set of bounded -measurable simple functions on S), monotone and supnorm
continuous. Finally, the latter property allows to extend I to the set of bounded
-measurable functions on S as B0 is norm dense in the latter set.
Proof of Theorem 2. In [11], it was shown that I takes the form









for C a weak*-compact set of probability measures,  : F+(S)! [0; 1] and u a
utility function on the prize space.
Set M = C  (S), and letM be the Borel tribe generated by the weak*-
topology on (S). Then, let  be dened by f 7 ! (f) where
(f)() =
Z
fd ;  2 (S)
Notice that C is measurable in (S) because it is weak*-closed.
In order to prove the theorem, we need to show two things:
(i)  is measurable in the sense of A.5.1, i.e. range()  F+(C);
(ii) the function  : F+(S) ! [0; 1] is compatible with the nucleous of
equivalence of , that is if f; g 2 F+(S) are such that (f) = (g), then (f) =
(g). This will allow us to dene  on F+(C) rather than on F+(S).
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To prove (i) observe that the function (f) : (S) ! R+ is trivially con-
tinuous for the weak*-topology on (S). Hence, it is measurable for the Borel
tribe generated by that topology.
(ii) was already observed by [11]. We provide here a slightly di¤erent proof.
Let f; g 2 F+(S) be such that (f) = (g). In the terminology of [11], this
implies that f is unambiguously indi¤erent to g. Since unambiguous preference
is a subrelation of the decision makers preference relation over acts, this implies











we have (f) = (g).
Proof of Theorem 5. Axioms A1 and A3imply the existence of a utility
function (not necessarily linear) on the prize space ([4]). By axiom CE, for
each f 2 F0there exists xf 2 X such that f  xf . Dene J : F0 ! R by
J(f) = u(xf ). Clearly, J represents %. Set W = range(u). Let B0(;W )
denote the set of bounded, -measurable simple functions with range in W .
The utility function u : X ! R denes an operator Tu : F0 ! B0(;W ) by




J & # I
R
B0(;W ) is a subset of B0, the set of bounded, -measurable simple functions.
B0 equipped with the supnorm is Banach space. Hence, it has su¢ ciently many
continuous linear functionals. That is, if a; b 2 B0, a 6= b, there exists a contin-
uous linear functionals L on B0 such that L(a) 6= L(b). By Riesz representation
theorem, a continuous linear functional on B0 has the form
R
ad, with  a
nitely additive measure on . Hence, the mapping  : B0(;W ) ! F ((S))
dened as in the statement of the proposition is one-to-one. As observed in the
proof of the previous theorem, (a) is a measurable function on (M = (S);M)
withM being the Borel tribe generated by the weak*-topology. Finally, dene
V as the unique functional that makes the following diagram commute
B0(;W )
 ! F+(M;M)
I & # V
R
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Proof of Theorem 6. By A1, A4 and LC, the set X along with the order
and the mixture operations is a (non-Archimedean) utility space in the sense on
Hausner [19]. Hausner [19] and Hausner and Wendel [20] have shown that there
exists an order-preserving embedding ~u (a utility, not real-valued) of X into an
ordered vector space OV . Denote by  the order on OV .
Dene a norm jj on OV , and denote by OV  its completion. That is, OV 
is a Banach space. By embedding OV into OV , each act f 2 F0 is associated
to the mapping ~u  f from S to the Banach space OV . For each f 2 F0,
~u  f is measurable and, being a simple function, is strongly measurable. Let
F0(S;OV
) be the set of all measurable simple mappings S ! OV .
Endow F0(S;OV ) with the norm dened by
kfk = fsup jf(s)j : s 2 Sg ; f 2 F0(S;OV )
Since OV  is a Banach space so is F0(S;OV ).
By CE (proceeding just like in the previous two proofs), there exists a map-
ping J : F0 ! OV  such that f % g i¤ J(f)  J(g).
For  2 (S) and a 2 F0(S;OV ), denote by
R
ad the Bochner integral
(see for instance [6]).
On M = (S), we dene a topology  as the coarsest topology such that
for any bounded strongly measurable function b : S ! OV 





Let B be the Borel tribe generated by  and let F ((S); OV ) be the space of
measurable mappings M ! OV  (these are the mappings that are measurable
with respect to B and the Borel tribe generated by the norm topology on OV ).
Dene  : f 7 ! f as in the statement of the theorem. The mapping is
clearly injective [If f; g 2 F0(S;OV ) and f 6= g then (since they are both
simple) there exists A 2  such that f(s) = x 2 OV  and g(s) = y 2 OV for
any s 2 A and x 6= y. Pick  2 (S) so that (A) = 1. Then, R fd 6=R
gd]. Moreover, for each f 2 F0(S;OV ) the mapping f is continuous for
the topology  and, hence, measurable. Hence, range()  F ((S); OV ).
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